Read the Summary of the Secret Service’s Internal Review

USSS - Public DisclosureIntroductionSince July 13, 2024, the United States Secret Service (Secret Service) has fielded anumber of questions surrounding Thomas Crooks' attempted assassination of formerPresident of the United States/Republican Presidential Nominee (FPOTUS/RPN)Donald Trump. This includes questions regarding the agency's organizational culture,executive oversight, operational leadership, and details regarding employee actionsthat may have contributed to the mission failure.The Secret Service Office of Professional Responsibility is conducting a missionassurance inquiry that will address these questions. A summary of that office's initialmission assurance report, which identifies potential causes for the July 13th missionfailure, is provided below. It will be followed by a supplemental report that will providerecommendations for agency leadership.Even before the conclusion of the mission assurance inquiry, the agency madeenhancements to FPOTUS/RPN Trump's protection. It should also be noted that theSecret Service's internal recommendations are separate from those that will resultfrom external inquires conducted by Congress, the White House/Department ofHomeland Security's Internal Review Panel, and the Department of HomelandSecurity Office of the Inspector General.This summary will primarily focus on deficiencies in the Secret Service protectiveadvance, along with the agency's interactions with its state and local law enforcementpartners, prior to the July 13th attack. The summary also addresses the agency'sdemanding operational tempo and how it may have contributed to mission failure.Command and Control / State and Local Law Enforcement PartnersThe Secret Service is the ultimate responsible party for the security planning at ourprotective venues. Accordingly, ensuring that our state and local counterparts have aclear understanding of our operational requirements and function is key to missionsuccess. Advance team personnel have an obligation to ensure that state and localsupport from law enforcement in all capacities meets the protective requirements andprinciples of Secret Service methodologies. However, interviews of Secret Servicepersonnel and partnering agencies revealed discrepancies in the understanding andexpectations of how various elements of the site security planning would beaccomplished.The Secret Service does not ask our state and local law enforcement partners tosupport protective operations by operating beyond the scope of their expertise. Thatwould not be prudent and would invite unintended consequences. For example, whenexecuting a comprehensive security plan involving state or local tactical assets, suchas a sniper team, the placement of those units is sometimes made in consultation withthe local tactical units and is not a unilateral decision by Secret Service personnel.Conversely, the location or placement of state or local tactical assets must not be

USSS - Public Disclosuremade without due consideration of Secret Service protective objectives or withoutdialogue between agency advance team personnel, field office supervisors, andprotective detail supervisors.A consistent theme gathered from state and local law enforcement personnel whohelped secure the Butler rally was the presence of communications deficiencies.These deficiencies included gaps in colocation of law enforcement resources to shareinformation, the variety of radio frequencies/channels used (again without thecolocation of physical personnel to convey information), and the capability of agencypersonnel to clearly convey the Secret Service's protective needs. Some local policeentities supporting the Butler venue had no knowledge that there were two separatecommunications centers on site (i.e., the Secret Service security room and the ButlerCounty Emergency Services Mobile Command Post). As a result, those entities wereoperating under a misimpression that the Secret Service was directly receiving theirradio transmissions.Routinely, the Secret Service coordinates with state and local law enforcement entitiesin preparation for protective visits. When those local law enforcement agenciesrequire additional assistance for the visit, they will often request mutual aid supportfrom additional neighboring police entities to accomplish the mission. This mutual aidsupport may include additional officers to stand post, providing motorcade support,traffic control personnel, tactical support, or other specialized assets. The SecretService is sometimes given advance notice of its local partners need to rely on mutualaid, but that is not always the case.Early in the protective visit advance process, the Secret Service invites all relevant lawenforcement entities to an initial police meeting. However, local jurisdictionalrequirements often change if the protectee's itinerary is modified. In the case of theButler rally, several nearby local law enforcement entities were employed to providemutual aid—a fact the Secret Service advance team was not initially made aware atthe time of the police meeting. It is not a common practice for the Secret Service toinvite neighboring or nearby police departments to a police meeting merely forawareness.In connection with the Butler rally, one local police entity requested mutual aid supportfrom another local department for tactical augmentation. Neither the Secret Service'sPittsburgh Field Office leadership nor anyone on the agency's advance team wereaware of this outreach for support. This led to a situation where the local tactical teamoperating on the second floor of the AGR building—a team that was providing mutualaid support had no prior contact with Secret Service personnel before the rally.Multiple law enforcement entities involved in securing the rally questioned the efficacyof that local sniper team's positioning in the AGR building, yet there was no follow-updiscussion about modifying their position. There was also no discussion with SecretService advance personnel about positioning that team atop the AGR roof. Localsniper support were apparently not opposed to that location.

USSS - Public DisclosureDeference & Protectee Exposure / Operational Follow-UpThe Secret Service works with any number of organizations to carry out its protectivemission. For example, engagement with the protectee's staff is a longstanding stapleof our operations. It is crucial that the agency maintain a professional rapport with thestaff advance teams to obtain timely and accurate information as it relates to theprotectees' schedules, public and private engagements, and other details that impactthe agency's ability to provide a safe and secure environment for the protectee.There is constant negotiation and information sharing between the Secret Service andthe protectee's respective staff as it relates to nearly every aspect of a protective visit.While negotiations with staff are a given, the security of the protectee is undeniablythe responsibility of the Secret Service. The staff selects the venues for theprotectees to visit and the Secret Service subsequently secures those venues. One ofthe primary considerations for any outdoor venue is minimizing the protectee'sexposure to long range threats, which usually come into play with those venues.There was some discussion regarding site selection between FPOTUS/RPN Trump'sstaff and local elected representatives, however it appears the Butler Farm Show sitewas selected by staff because it was the better venue to accommodate the largenumber of desired attendees. The site was seen by the Secret Service and our locallaw enforcement partners as a challenge.Advance personnel and multiple supervisors with oversight of the security plan at theButler Farm Show venue recognized line of site concerns. However, the securitymeasures to alleviate these concerns were not carried out on July 13, 2024 asintended. There was a lack of detailed knowledge by Secret Service personnelregarding the state or local law enforcement presence that would be present in andaround the AGR complex. There was also a lack of knowledge regarding the specificfootprint of resources that would buttress the secure area of the venue and separate itfrom the AGR complex, which was outside of the site's secure perimeter.The construction of the protected site, along with line of site mitigation to address thevulnerabilities created by the open grounds of the AGR complex, should have been akey objectives of the site advance. The lack of due diligence in site construction wasevident. Advance personnel should have reported any discrepancies or lack of clarityto detail and field office supervisors.Communications InconsistencyThe different radio frequencies used at the Butler Farm Show venue were notconducive for quickly sharing real-time information. A central tenet of law enforcementoperations is effective communications. The Secret Service employs this standardapplication in its protective advance procedures to maximize overlap incommunications and to ensure a common operating platform for all law enforcemententities supporting a protective visit. Providing overlapping or redundant

USSS - Public Disclosurecommunications for a protective site is crucial. Similarly, multiple communicationstouchpoints maximize the likelihood of that consequential information will be shared ina timely fashion. There were multiple standard conduits of communication that werenot in operation on July 13, 2024, which if present would have increased theprobability of pertinent information or context being conveyed.The failure of personnel to broadcast via radio the description of the assailant, or vitalinformation received from local law enforcement regarding a suspicious individual onthe roof of the AGR complex, to all federal personnel at the Butler site inhibited thecollective awareness of all Secret Service personnel. This failure was especially acutein terms of the FPOTUS/RPN's protective detail, who were not apprised of howfocused state and local law enforcement were in the minutes leading up to the attackon locating the suspicious subject. If this information was passed over Secret Serviceradio frequencies it would have allowed FPOTUS/RPS's protective detail to determinewhether to move their protectee while the search for the suspicious suspect was inprogress. Vital information was transmitted via mobile/cellular devices in staggered orfragmented fashion instead of being relayed via the Secret Service radio network.Specialty Asset ImpactThere have been numerous questions regarding the approval, denial, and decision-making process for specialized assets surrounding FPOTUS/RPN Trump's visit toButler, PA on July 13, 2024. The visit of FPOTUS/RPN Trump to Butler, PA wassupported by Secret Service counter sniper and counter assault assets. These andother tactical assets are sometimes augmented by law enforcement partners. Whilethe advance team from the local office and the protective detail were affordedsufficient notice to conduct an unabbreviated advance, the counter sniper assetarrived later during the advance week. Having all members of the advance teampresent to engage local law enforcement counterparts beginning with the initial formalpolice meeting and onwards provides more time and opportunity to begin nuancedconversations and planning.The FPOTUS/RPN's protective detail provided a counter unmanned aerial systemadvance agent for the visit to Butler, PA. Due to the former president's schedule,which involves a steady cadence of outdoor events and activity, the protective detailprioritized this asset to counter drones and similar threats. There were some technicaldifficulties experienced by the advance personnel with that system. It is possible thatif this element of the advance had functioned properly, the shooter may have beendetected as he flew his drone near the Butler Farm Show venue earlier in the day.Operational TempoThe Secret Service is a proud organization with a critical mission. While this prideresonates throughout the agency's workforce, this pride can lead to overextension infurtherance of carrying out that mission. Resources did not factor into this missionfailure. Ever-increasing responsibilities place the agency in the unenviable position of